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Abstract: We conduct an empirical investigation to explain observed differentials in mortgage
overage pricing. Our analysis makes several contributions. First, we study an area of mortgage pricing
that is little understood by consumers and has received little scrutiny in the literature. Second, we
consider the impact of the market power of individual loan officers on overages paid by borrowers,
particularly minorities. Third, we include a number of borrower and lender characteristics not
available in previous analysis.
Importantly, we introduce a new direct measure of the market power of individual loan
officers. We also incorporate the interactive effects of loan officer market power and the race of the
borrower in determining the rate of the mortgage loan. Through the use of these new variables and
employing proprietary data from different branches of a nationwide mortgage lending institution, we
conclude that the market power of the lender and the bargaining or negotiating ability of the
borrower are important determinants of overages. We find that overages paid by minorities who
purchase homes are larger than those paid by whites. Our evidence suggests that this is due to
differences in the pools of borrowers rather than to racial discrimination. Indeed, tests show that the
pool of refinancings is more homogeneous across races than the pool for purchases, and we find no
differences by race for refinancings. We conclude that a more effective way to eliminate racial
differences in overages is to pursue policies designed to increase the ability of minorities to bargain
more effectively rather than to enact additional antidiscrimination laws.
JEL classification: G18, G21, G28, G38
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1.  Introduction 
 
  Lending practices of financial institutions have been subject to close regulatory scrutiny for 
decades.  Financial institutions that offer mortgage loans are governed by laws and regulations 
prohibiting lending discrimination.  Enforcement efforts of federal regulators have mainly been concerned 
with whether minorities are denied loans that similarly situated whites would have been granted.   
  A relatively new regulatory interest is the pricing of mortgage overages to minorities.  Overages, 
sometimes called yield spreads, are typically expressed in units of percent of the loan, called points.  
Overages are usually calculated as total loan points, less origination fees, less minimum acceptable 
points charged on the loan.  Thus, overages represent the amount charged in excess of the lowest rate 
acceptable to the lender.  
The question explored in this paper is whether overages differ across groups.  That is, do 
certain groups of the population such as minorities, women, the elderly and the less educated, have a 
different average incidence and size of overage than the rest of the population?  The Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency has examined banks to determine if collecting overages is discriminatory 
(Courchane and Nickerson (1997)), and the Department of Justice has entered into settlements after 
contending that overages resulted in minority borrowers paying higher overages than non-minority 
borrowers.
1  These settlements limited the amount of overages that could be collected and instituted 
comprehensive fair lending policies by the lenders. 
  Although there has been a great deal of work concerning discrimination in the accept/reject 
mortgage decision (e.g. Black, Schweitzer and Mandell (1978), Longhofer (1996) and Munnell, 
Browne, McEneaney, and Tootell (1996), as well as Horne’s critiques of the latter (1994, 1997)),  very 
little work has been done on the pricing of accepted mortgages with respect to race.  There are 
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noteworthy exceptions.  Black and Schweitzer (1985) study mortgage lending terms at commercial 
banks and find that race and marital status play significant roles in determining lending terms at the bank 
that they analyzed.  Their study is the first to examine an individual bank and generate results that are 
consistent with the possibility of discrimination in loan terms established for accepted loans.  Similarly, 
Crawford and Rosenblatt (1995) examine yield premiums for originated loans.  They compared 
premiums across three racial groups over a two-year period in the late 1980s.  In contrast to the results 
of Black and Schweitzer (1985), they find little evidence of significant differences across racial groups, 
although small premiums are observed for VA and FHA loans.  Calem and Stutzler (1995) state that 
there is little evidence regarding whether minority borrowers receive less favorable loan terms than white 
borrowers, but that may have more to do with the lack of rate data than with the absence of 
discrimination. 
  Ayres and Siegelman (1995) study differential pricing by race.  They use paired testers in Chicago 
automobile dealerships to study sales offers to white and minority buyers.  They find that white males 
are quoted lower purchase prices than minorities and females, and that these differences are generally 
statistically and economically significant.  They report that racial discrimination does not explain their 
results.  They argue that automobile salesmen (and women) believe that minorities and women have 
higher reservation prices and that profit maximizing salesman rationally quote higher prices to them. 
  To our knowledge, the only studies to look directly at the issue of overages are Courchane and 
Nickerson (1997) and Black, Boehm and DeGennaro (forthcoming).  Courchane and Nickerson 
analyze three financial institutions separately and focus primarily on the applicant's race.  In all three 
cases, they find differences by race in either overages or the likelihood of being charged an overage, 
though no consistent pattern is evident.  Investigation of the actual loan documents leads the authors to 
suggest that differences in bargaining or negotiating power of whites and minorities may have caused the 3   
observed racial differences in overages, but their data do not allow them to test this hypothesis.
2  Black, 
Boehm and DeGennaro study overages from an area with a high population of Hispanics and African-
Americans.  They find that the yield spreads of Hispanic applicants who purchase homes are larger than 
those of whites.  They find no differences in overages between black and white applicants.  They do find 
significant racial differences in overages for Hispanics and blacks for houses that are refinanced. 
  Our paper offers an important new dimension to studies of racial differences in markets.  
Previously, lack of information on overages has severely limited research in this area.  Featuring 
proprietary data gathered from loan offices of a leading nationwide lending institution, this paper fills that 
void.  Using variables unavailable to previous researchers, we analyze the relative importance of various 
hypotheses that may explain observed differentials in overages.  For both purchases and refinancings, 
we find strong evidence that bargaining power has a substantial influence on the magnitude of overages 
charged.  In contrast, traditional risk measures that are crucially important to the accept/reject decision 
have little impact on overage pricing.  This is not surprising, because all loans in our dataset are 
originated and thus have at least minimally acceptable risk levels. 
Our direct measure of the net market power of individual loan officers suggests that their 
expertise in financial negotiations has both a statistically and economically significant impact on overages 
charged.  However, these loan officers apparently either do not use their full capabilities when 
bargaining with minorities, or else their bargaining skills with whites do not extend to minorities.  Finally, 
the insignificance of race variables and reduced importance of bargaining in the results for refinancings 
suggest that less bargaining occurs in these transactions.  Based on our results, the implication is that the 
disparate impact observed for minority overages (at institutions like the one we study) is best reduced 
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not through stricter regulatory enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, but rather by increasing 
competition and the financial information and bargaining skills of borrowers who are purchasing homes. 
2.  The Nature of Overages 
  Overages are not well understood by the consumer.  In fact, most consumers are unaware of 
their existence.  An overage is the difference between the price at which a loan closes and the minimum 
price acceptable to the lending institution as quoted on the lender’s rate sheet.  The rate sheet, an 
important tool in the pricing of the loans, shows the various combinations of interest rates and discount 
points at which a lender will make a loan.  Typically, lower interest rates are coupled with higher points.  
Some rate sheets also show the interest rates offered in the secondary market for loans that will be 
delivered in 15, 45 and 60 days.  Normally, the rates quoted by lenders to customers and those 
advertised by the lenders are 60-day rates.  
  There is no well-defined industry practice with regard to overages.  Across financial institutions 
there is great variability in the use of overages.  Many lending institutions allow and even encourage their 
loan officers to charge overages.  In such institutions overages typically constitute a significant portion of 
the loan officers’ compensation.
3  Some financial institutions do not allow overages to be collected at all, 
while others restrict the size of overages.
4  Overages may vary across regions and across branches of 
the same institution, and may differ substantially  from one loan officer to another.  Overages may also 
differ across loan types.  For example,  
government insured mortgages generally have higher incidences of overages than conventional loans.  
However, in some markets with strong competition for government-insured mortgages, conventional 
loans may have higher overages.  Overages may also differ across borrowers, which has caused federal 
                                                 
3 Loan officers’ total compensation for our lender includes a base salary, income from overages and a commission 
earned on successful loan closings. 
4 Our lender limits overages to two percent. 5   
scrutiny (and led to Department of Justice settlements) because charging different rates for the same 
product may result in disparate treatment of minorities.  
  Overages may occur because of the behavior of borrowers, lenders or sellers.  For the borrower, a 
lack of financial information, a severe liquidity constraint, risk aversion, or the unwillingness to pursue 
negotiations for a better deal could lead to an overage.  Because the borrower may be unaware of how 
the loan is priced, the most common way that an overage results is if the borrower agrees to a mortgage 
rate that is above the minimum quoted on the lender's rate sheet.  Since the consumer is generally 
unaware of the terms listed on the rate sheet, the lender may quote a higher rate or a larger number of 
points, resulting in an overage.  If the borrower chooses to bargain for a lower rate, the overage may be 
reduced, eliminated or even converted to a negative overage, which is called an underage.  Borrowers 
who do not shop for a better offer, perhaps due to the opportunity cost of time, are less likely to 
negotiate a better deal. 
  Another common way overages arise is if the borrower is risk averse.  Assume that the borrower is 
fully aware of the various pricing alternatives and expects to close in 30 days, but wants a 60-day lock 
(i.e., a rate guaranteed to be available for 60 days) because of risk aversion and fears that the loan may 
not close in time.  If the lender believes the loan will close sooner, he can lock the lower 45-day rate in 
the secondary market.  When the loan closes at the higher 60-day rate, an overage is created.
5 
Consistent with the practice of many lenders, the overages collected in our dataset are shared 
equally between the loan officer and the lender.  Given that our lender limits the overage to two percent, 
the maximum amount that could have been collected is $3,765,172.
6  As noted above, consumers are 
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similar to those of competitors and an excess marking up of the rate using overages could result in lower loan volume 
if customers shopped the rate.  Second, overages were an expected form of compensation in their market and their 
loan officers expected overages as a salary supplement. 6   
generally unaware that overages exist.  Consequently, one would anticipate that both the loan officers 
and the lender would seek to maximize the incidence and the dollar amount of overages.  In fact, only 
17.9% of the mortgages in our dataset had a positive overage.  The dollar value of overages collected 
was only $183,536, far below the maximum of $3,765,172.  Why aren’t overages maximized within the 
limits set by the lender?  That is, why would loan officers and the lender not maximize income in the 
absence of regulatory constraints and consumers’ awareness?  This paper addresses these issues. 
3.  Data and Descriptive Analysis 
  The unique data used in this analysis are for loans made during 1996 for a major mortgage 
lending institution at its loan offices nationwide.  The name of the institution is not disclosed for 
confidentiality reasons.  It is important to note that the lender actively pursues fair lending policies and 
does not permit overages on certain products marketed to low-income borrowers, as well as limiting 
overages on allowable products to two percent.  These policies conform to previous settlements 
between the Department of Justice and two lenders accused of discriminating against minorities in 
collecting overages. 
  A list of variable names, definitions and means is in Table 1.  Because tests show that loans for 
purchases differ from refinancings, we partition the data accordingly.  The variable of interest, and the 
dependent variable in our regressions, is the overage, calculated as the dollar amount of the overage 
collected divided by the dollar amount of the loan, expressed as a percentage.  For the institution we 
study, all loans in our sample were sold in the secondary market and the overage depends solely on the 
amount the loan brings in the market relative to the rate stated on the rate sheet at the time of the loan.
7  
Again, overages can be negative if the borrower pays fewer points than those stated on the rate sheet.  
The minimum points charged on a particular type of loan with a particular interest rate are established 
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by bank management and communicated to loan officers via rate sheets as frequently as four times 
daily.  To the extent other institutions use other definitions, this may limit the generality of our results.
8 
  Table 1 reveals several key features of the data.  First, overages are smaller on purchases than on 
loans for refinancing.  This is true proportionately (10.27 basis points vs. 13.35 basis points) and in 
dollars ($97.57 vs. $122.44).  Purchases are also of longer maturity than refinancings and less likely to 
be conventional loans.  The vast majority of borrowers are white and male, but because our sample is 
large (2,002), we have adequate numbers of loans to minorities. 
  Tables 2 and 3 provide information on overages in the sample.  Panel A of Table 2 shows 
differences in overages across branches.  The percentage of positive overages varies from 7.4% 
 in City I to 40.9% in City J.  The mean overage amount varies from 0.279% in City I to 0.801% in 
City J.  Overall, the percentage of loans with positive overages is only 17.9%.  Given that the majority 
of consumers are unaware of the practice of collecting overages, one might expect this percentage to 
be higher.  Thus, market forces may be limiting the incidence as well as the amount of overages. 
  Panel B of Table 2 reports differences across individual loan officers. The median (mean) loan 
officer collects overages on 19.4% (21.5%) of the loans in our sample.  Of those positive overages, the 
mean overage collected by the median (mean) loan officer 60 basis points (61.5 basis points).  Panel B 
makes it clear that some loan officers collect overages much more often than others, and some collect 
much larger overages than others. 
  Panel C of Table 2 shows that the frequency of overages varies across racial groups.  Point 
estimates show that black borrowers have the highest incidence of overages, followed by Hispanic 
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given period, the broker has delivered a specified volume of loans to the lender).  We do not consider these components of 
overages for several reasons.  First, our data simply do not include them.  Second, a service release premium represents a second 
decision solely at the discretion of the lender.  The applicant has no say in the matter.  Finally, back-end points are related not to 
individual loans, but rather to total volume. 8   
borrowers, members of other minority racial groups and whites.  All but one of these is statistically 
significant with respect to white borrowers (t-statistic, black vs. white = 7.64; Hispanic vs. white = 
2.81; other vs. white = 0.23).  The mean overage amount is highest for Hispanics, followed by blacks, 
whites and other minorities (t-statistic, black vs. white = 2.52; Hispanic vs. white = 2.85; other vs. 
white = -0.41).  Thus, it is clear that blacks and Hispanics have higher incidences of overages and have 
higher overages than do whites. 
  Panel A of Table 3 reports overages by race and market.  The mean amount by which 
overages paid by minority groups exceeds those paid by whites varies widely, from highs of 0.458% 
(for blacks), 0.795% (for Hispanics) and 0.185% (for others) to lows of -0.060% for blacks, -
0.128% for Hispanics, and -0.206% for others.  This relatively large range, along with several of these 
differences actually being negative, suggests that this lender has no overt policy that would promote 
differential treatment of different racial groups.  In addition, large variation in minority overages exists 
across the branches.  Panel B of Table 3 shows the two branches that have the highest and the lowest 
differentials between each minority and whites of any branches with more than five loans to minorities.  
Regardless of racial group or branch, almost 50% to 75% of the loans have no overage charged.  
Again, this occurs even though most borrowers are unaware of overages and make no conscious effort 
to reduce them.  In addition, in only one instance is any overage greater than two percent. 
4.  The Determinants of Overages 
  We postulate that overages are a function of four factors: market power, individual bargaining 
skill, the race of the borrower, and risk, which we partition into default risk and approval risk.  Table 4 
lists variables likely to be associated with these four factors and the signs of their expected relations to 
overages.  We provide the intuition of these signs next. 
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Market Power 
  At certain times, either lenders or borrowers may enjoy temporary advantages in certain markets 
for certain loan products.  Thus, the relative market power between the two parties is a function of a 
specific time, place, and asset.  For example, a fall in mortgage rates could lead to an increase in the 
market power of either group.  When mortgage rates fall substantially and the quantity of mortgages 
demanded increases, new mortgage banking firms may enter the market, increasing competition and 
bidding rates down.  This increases the market power of the borrowers in the lending process.  
Another example might trace to a sudden drop in rates, which increases the number of borrowers 
seeking to refinance on short notice.  In this case, the fall in rates increases the market power of 
lenders.  We arbitrarily view this from the lender's side and treat an increase in the market power of 
lenders as likely to increase overages. 
  Despite the richness of our dataset, obtaining useful proxy variables for market power is difficult.  
First, though the loans in our sample were closed in 1996, the specific dates are not included in the 
dataset so it is not possible to indicate time precisely.  Second, although we know the city in which the 
loans are originated, it is impossible to predict the sign of that variable's impact on market power.  
Therefore, we do not include place as a variable to proxy for market power (though we do include city 
in sensitivity analysis later; it proves to be insignificant). 
  We have more promising variables to control for asset.  The markets for 30-year and 
conventional mortgages are generally deeper and more competitive than for other types of mortgage 
loans, reducing the lender's market power.  In addition, adjustable-rate loans often have below-market 
interest rates for the first year.  If a borrower is attracted to this for any reason, market power is likely 
to be ceded to the lender.  For example, the borrower may require the lower initial payment in order to 
qualify for the loan.  If the borrower expects to move before the lender can recoup, the borrower may 10   
be willing to pay extra for this opportunity.  If market power is a factor in determining overages, then 
we expect fixed-rate loans to have lower overages than other types. 
  Overages are more often charged on FHA and VA loans than on conventional loans.  In large 
part, this is because of the cost of making an FHA/VA loan.  Because FHA/VA loans are generally 
smaller than conventional mortgages, the origination fee (which is proportional to loan size) may not 
cover the cost of origination.  However, regulatory agencies do not allow explicit increases in rates or 
fees to compensate for this.  As a result, an overage is often extracted to make the loan profitable.
9 
  For at least two reasons, we predict that as LOAN AMOUNT increases, the applicant's market 
power also increases.  First, applicants for larger loans may be more financially astute, have more 
funding options, and be better able to shop for lower rates which result in a lower overage.  Second, 
under competition, lenders can only recover the economic costs of processing the loan application.  To 
the extent that overages compensate the loan officer, they would not increase proportionately to loan 
size.  Thus, larger loans have lower percentage overages, which compensate the loan officer for the 
time required to make a smaller loan. 
  Finally, we measure the intensity of competition and the lender’s market strategy by using the 
variables MARKET PENETRATION and VOLUME.  We define MARKET PENETRATION as 
the percentage of loans made by the lender to the borrower’s racial sub-market.  We assume that 
borrowers tend to apply for mortgages where they think the application will most likely be accepted.  If 
a lender makes a larger proportion of loans to a given ethnic group, then it likely faces less competition 
in that sub-market and has greater market power among that group.  Consequently, overages should 
be higher because the borrower is less likely to shop for another rate.  This argument presumes that we 
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the cost of making the loan to be a function of the bargaining power of the loan officer.  Such a strategy is 11   
have controlled for the lender’s marketing strategy: some lenders choose to operate with high volume 
and low profit margins.  This probably extends to lower overages.  To disentangle this from MARKET 
PENETRATION we also include VOLUME, defined as the total number of loans made by a 
particular lender.  Lenders with higher total volume likely have lower overages in a given market. 
  One problem with this approach is that MARKET PENETRATION and VOLUME are 
probably determined simultaneously with the dependent variable, OVERAGE.  To resolve this we use 
the corresponding values of MARKET PENETRATION and VOLUME from the previous year, 
1995, as instruments.  As a practical matter, the results are virtually indistinguishable. 
  Note that neither the race of the borrower nor other individual traits such as gender, education, 
income or credit record appear as determinants of bargaining power.  Thus, for market power to differ 
across groups or traits, one must argue that the group is in the market a disproportionate amount for a 
particular loan at a particular time and place.  Absent that, groups have the same market power. 
Individual Bargaining Skill 
  Some individuals might be better at bargaining than others.  Two key distinctions exist between 
this and market power.  The first is the word individual.  Regardless of the status of the market, 
individual x might bargain better than individual y.  Second, we wish to separate bargaining skill from 
bargaining position.  For example, some borrowers might have poor credit records and thus be in bad 
bargaining positions, yet if they are excellent negotiators, they may obtain better terms than would 
similarly situated borrowers who lack these skills.  Similarly, a loan officer with a track record of 
collecting large overages is likely to be a good bargainer, and other borrowers who deal with such a 
loan officer are likely to pay more. 
                                                                                                                                                             
reasonable, and a direct subsidy paid by FHA/VA to the loan officer would probably be a more efficient way to 
cover origination costs.  Why these agencies do not use this approach, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. 12   
  An important component of individual bargaining skill is the willingness to exploit the advantages 
at one’s disposal.  Some borrowers or lending officers may sometimes be unwilling to expend the effort 
needed to negotiate effectively, even though at other times they are skilled negotiators.  Because it 
takes two to bargain, we interpret Individual Bargaining Skill (IBS) as net IBS.  As with Market 
Power, we view this from the loan officer’s perspective.  Thus, an increase in (net) IBS tends to 
increase overages. 
  We call the first ten variables that control for IBS indirect components of IBS because they do 
not measure bargaining skill directly.  Rather, they identify traits correlated with negotiating acumen.  
The first of these is a dichotomous variable (MALE) to control for possible differences in bargaining 
ability between men and women.  Our education measure is captured by four binary variables signifying 
high school graduate, training beyond high school, college graduate and education beyond college 
(EDU1 through EDU4).  We anticipate that as the borrower’s EDUCATION increases, so do 
confidence and reasoning ability, reducing net IBS and tending to reduce overages.  PRIOR 
OWNERSHIP provides experience in the loan application process and is negatively related to net IBS. 
  We assume that a loan officer’s net individual bargaining skill increases on SECONDARY 
residences and with YEARS IN HOME.  First, we assume that borrowers are less likely to negotiate 
for loans on SECONDARY residences than on primary residences.  The borrower might be more 
attracted to a particular feature or the location of the home and pay higher overages because of greater 
concern for a rapid, sure approval than for bargaining for the best loan terms.  Second, loan applicants 
who have occupied the same home for longer periods are likely to bargain less than more mobile 
applicants who have owned more primary residences.  Both of these tend to increase the loan officer’s 
bargaining advantage. 13   
  The sign for AGE is less clear.  One might argue that older people's experience (perhaps in other 
negotiating or bargaining relationships, such as car buying) helps them during the mortgage lending 
process.  Alternatively, one might postulate that older people are more interested in a fast, sure closing 
with a minimum of stress, and therefore are less likely to bargain.  If so, then higher AGE reduces 
negotiating skills (more precisely, the willingness to negotiate), thus tipping net individual bargaining skill 
towards the loan officer. 
  The next component of IBS is the loan rate.  Individuals with the best bargaining skills should 
obtain loans with lower interest rates or points.  However, as extensive as our dataset is, it does not 
encompass all variables that might plausibly affect these skills.  For example, marital status or some 
idiosyncratic aspect of the borrower’s background may affect the individual’s ability to bargain 
successfully.  On average, one would expect individuals with weaker bargaining skills to pay higher 
interest rates.  They would pay higher rates on loans, per se, which would be correlated with overages.  
Thus, including LOAN RATE controls for unmeasurable bargaining skills.
10 
  Like MARKET PENETRATION and VOLUME, LOANRATE might seem to be 
simultaneously determined with overages, but this is not necessarily the case.  Both the borrower and 
the loan officer take the lender’s rate sheet as given; it is predetermined.  To the extent that negotiations 
turn on the number of points rather than the interest rate, LOANRATE is not subject to simultaneity 
problems. 
  In contrast to the variables discussed so far, the last variable for Individual Bargaining Skill is a 
direct measure of IBS.  We define MOW as the Mean Overage the loan officer handling the 
application extracts from White applicants.  This variable is new to the literature and is useful in 
understanding the importance of the bargaining skill of the loan officer in determining the loan rate.  To 14   
avoid simultaneous equations bias, if loan application i is from a white applicant and is processed by 
loan officer j, we delete observation i from the computation of the mean overage for loan officer j for 
that observation.  If loan officer j made only one loan in our dataset, we use the mean overage 
collected from white borrowers for that branch office.  For expositional ease we sometimes refer to this 
variable as the mean overage that a loan officer collects from whites, even though this is not quite 
accurate in the case of white borrowers.  
Racial Factors 
  Some researchers might include race as a proxy for individual bargaining skill.  Certainly, 
differences in bargaining power could exist across different racial groups.  For example, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that middle-class black males associate the need (or willingness) to negotiate with 
poverty, which may limit their desire to bargain (Brown, 1990).  However, categorical race variables 
could also indicate the presence of discrimination.  Theory tells us that discrimination is absent from fully 
competitive markets.  Mortgage markets may not be fully competitive, though, and discrimination may 
exist. 
  Race variables may also be correlated with risk differentials between minority and white 
households.  However, our dataset omits detailed credit information on individual credit risk.  While our 
dataset does not allow us to control for all risk, we believe that it is highly unlikely that differential credit 
risk plays any significant role in influencing the magnitude of overages.  Our sample comprises only 
loans that have been originated, not merely applications.  Since the underwriter is responsible for 
approving these loans, default risk would seem to be relatively unimportant to the loan officer in 
negotiations with the borrower.  Given this, if minorities are charged higher overages, it is either 
because of discrimination or because (as a group) they bargain less effectively than other groups. 
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  To investigate these effects empirically, we include both categorical variables for race and 
interaction terms between race and MOW, our direct measure of loan officer bargaining skill.  We 
define BLACKMOW, HISPANICMOW, and OTHERMOW as equal to MOW if the borrower is a 
member of the respective race and zero otherwise.  The signs for these interaction terms could be 
positive or negative.  If loan officers are more successful in extracting overages from minorities, then the 
interaction terms would be positive and significant.  If loan officers are equally successful with minorities 
as they are with white borrowers, then these interaction terms would be insignificant.  Finally, loan 
officers may make a special effort not to elicit high overages from their minority clients, perhaps due to 
training by the bank or fear of legal problems.  Consequently, the sign could be negative. 
Risk 
  Most economists agree that risk plays an important role in lending.  Yet, there are reasons to 
believe that risk variables may not explain much variation in overages.  First, credit risk may already be 
reflected in the rate sheets.  Second, because all loans in our sample are immediately sold in the 
secondary market and thus meet the credit standard for that market, one could make a case that the 
risk characteristics of our sample are sufficiently homogenous as to render plausible explanatory 
variables insignificant.  Indeed, the biggest risk facing a loan officer is that the loan may fail to close, 
resulting in a lost commission. 
  As a practical matter, though, we adopt the conservative strategy of considering a broad 
spectrum of risks, relying on regression techniques to identify insignificant variables.  These risk 
variables could be important for two reasons.  First, if their coefficients are insignificant, it enhances our 
contention that categorical race variables (if significant) are picking up either discrimination or 
differential bargaining power and not risk.  Second, it is possible that these risk variables could capture 
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a dimension of bargaining power not controlled for elsewhere.  Specifically, a borrower may be an 
acceptable credit risk, yet his unfamiliarity with credit standards could create a bargaining disadvantage, 
particularly if there is a potential problem and uncertainty whether the loan will be granted.  For our 
purposes, mortgage risk has two components, default or credit risk and approval risk.  We take each 
in turn. 
  Table 5 lists the variables that control for default risk and provides the intuition justifying their 
expected relation to overages.  Note that some variables appear in more than one determinant of 
overages.  Consider, for example, TERM30.  In Market Power, its predicted relation to overages is 
negative, because competitive pressure reduces a lender's market power, resulting in lower overages.  
In Default Risk, the predicted relation is positive.  Longer maturities imply greater default risk, resulting 
in higher overages.  If these conflicting signs result in statistical insignificance, it might be interpreted as 
an unfortunate result.  If, however, the coefficient is statistically significant, it constitutes evidence in 
favor of one determinant of overages and against the other, helping us distinguish between these 
competing explanations (or, at least, their relative impacts). 
  In addition to default risk, we argue that the lending officer is concerned with the risk that the loan 
may not close, resulting in the loss of the commission.  We call this approval risk.  The variables 
proxying for approval risk and the intuition of their signs are identical to default risk, except that: 
1) We add LIQUID/TOTAL ASSETS; higher values mean that the applicant is more likely 
to have funds to close.  A better variable would encompass funds needed to close, but this 
is not available. 
2) The relation between 30-year loans (TERM30) and overages is reversed because they 
have smaller payments for a given loan size and market value, so they are more likely to be 
approved. 17   
3) We exclude loan amount as there is no reason why, ceteris paribus, larger loans are 
less likely to be approved. 
 
  We assume that these four factors -- market power, individual bargaining skill, racial factors and 
risk -- describe all systematic factors that determine overages. 
  Assuming that the factors are linearly related to overages, a regression specification can be 
written: 
(1)  OVERAGE = b0 + b1TERM30 + b2FIXED + b3CONVENTIONAL + b4LOAN AMOUNT + 
b5COMPETITION + b6VOLUME + b7MALE + b8EDU1 + b9EDU2 + b10EDU3 +b11EDU4 + 
b12PRIOR OWNERSHIP + b13SECONDARY RESIDENCE + b14YEARS IN HOME + b15AGE + 
b16LOAN RATE + b17MOW + b18BLACK + b19HISPANIC + b20OTHER MINORITY + 
b21BLACKMOW + b22HISPANICMOW + b23OTHERMOW + b24LTV + b25LTV‡80 + 
b26INCOME + b27CREDIT PROBLEM + b28JOB YEARS + b29SELF-EMPLOYED + 
b30OBLIGATIONS/INC + b31CHECKING + b32SAVINGS + b33LIQUID/TOTAL ASSETS + u. 
In some cases, bi measures the combined effect of the associated variables impact as they operate 
through more than one argument in Equation (1). 
  In all of the equations we estimate, regardless of how we stratify the data, no overage is charged 
for at least half of the observations.  Given this type of dependent variable, ordinary least squares is 
asymptotically biased and inefficient.  Therefore, we estimated a Tobit model (see Maddala, 1983).  
However, tests indicated nonnormality and heteroskedasticity.  Tobit models are inconsistent in this 
case.  Consequently, we estimated a selectivity bias model (see Heckman, 1976).  This model differs 
from Tobit in that it assumes heteroskedasticity and that the observations come from different 
populations.  In the first stage, a probit or logit model is estimated in which the dependent variable is 18   
defined to be whether or not the borrower paid an overage.   The coefficients from this equation are 
used to calculate a Mill’s ratio for inclusion in a second OLS regression in which the sample is 
constrained to only those households that paid an overage.
11 
  The results presented below separate the loans into two types, purchases and refinancings.  
Initially, we pooled all loans and used intercept and slope binary variables to capture the differences 
between purchases and refinancings.  This model, in conjunction with our discussions with those in the 
industry, suggested that equations should be estimated separately for these two types of loans. 
5. Results 
Purchases 
  Table 6 contains results from estimating Equation (1) using 1,414 loans for purchases (columns 1 
and 2) and 588 loans for refinancings (columns 3 and 4).  Of these borrowers, 222 purchases (column 
2) and 136 refinancings  (column 4) had positive overages.  For purchases, the Market Power 
hypothesis predicts the signs of coefficients quite well.  In the logit regression, estimating the likelihood 
that a borrower will  pay an overage, all variables controlling for Market Power (TERM30, FIXED, 
CONVENTIONAL, LOAN AMOUNT, MARKET PENETRATION, VOLUME) have the 
predicted signs except for a single case, MARKET PENETRATION, for which the coefficient is 
insignificant.  Two variables (FIXED and CONVENTIONAL) are significant.  In the Stage 2 
regression FIXED, MARKET PENETRATION and VOLUME have the expected sign.  FIXED is 
significant at the 10% level using a one-tailed test.  The estimates from these regressions imply that on a 
                                                 
 
11 The Mill’s ratio is computed as follows: M = gZ + ln(1 - P) / P for cases in which there is no overage and M = gZ + 
ln(P) /(1-P) for cases that pay an overage.  P = the probability that an overage was charged = 1 / (1 + exp(-gZ)).  Z 
represents a set of independent variables used in estimating the logit model and g represents the corresponding 
parameter estimates.  Subsequently, using OLS, the following model is estimated for those borrowers who pay 
overages: y = bX + lM + e.  X represents a vector of independent variables hypothesized to explain the magnitude of 
the overages for those borrowers who have one.  Note that Z may include X, but it must also include at least one 
continuous variable that is not in X for the two-equation model to be identified. 19   
fixed rate loan there is a 27.40 percentage point lower likelihood that an overage will be charged.  
Similarly, for a conventional loan there is a 12.44 percentage point lower likelihood that an overage will 
be charged.  If overages are charged, point estimates imply that overages on fixed-rate loans are about 
31.69 basis points lower than on adjustable rate loans ($316.90 on a $100,000 loan).
12   In addition, 
higher volume of activity in a market decreases the amount of the overage charged by 1.90 basis 
points. 
  Of the indirect measures of Individual Bargaining Skill, only LOAN RATE is correctly signed and 
significant in both purchase equations.  YEARS IN HOME is correctly signed and just misses 
significance at the 10% level in the logit equation.  This indicates that applicants who have spent more 
years in their home are more likely to be charged an overage.  In addition, of those who are charged 
overages, male applicants have a significantly lower average overage than do their female counterparts.   
    The direct measure of loan officer bargaining skill (MOW) and the categorical race variables are 
all significant in the logit equation, and in the Stage 2 regression, column 2 of Table 6, HISPANIC is 
significant.  In addition, the interactions between MOW and the race variables are all significant in the 
logit equation that predicts the likelihood of receiving an overage and have a comparable sign in the 
conditional regression predicting the magnitude of any overage paid.  Together these variables paint an 
interesting picture of minority lending.  The coefficient for MOW is highly significant and positive.  The 
estimates suggest that a one percentage point increase in MOW increases the likelihood of a borrower 
having an overage by 54.94 percentage points.  In the overage regression, for those that do have an 
overage, the point estimate of MOW’s impact is relatively large at 143.50 basis points.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
12 Note that the variable CONVENTIONAL is not included in the regression.  For the equations to be identified with 
the inclusion of the Mills ratio, one variable must be excluded .  CONVENTIONAL is a good candidate because it is a 
significant predictor of whether an overage was charged, but it was never a significant predictor of the magnitude of 
the overage in any specification of the model.  20   
coefficients on the categorical race variables are also highly significant in the logit equation and have 
positive signs, but of those who do pay an overage, only Hispanics pay a statistically greater amount 
than whites.  Finally, all interaction terms between race variables and MOW are highly significant and 
negative in the logit equation. 
  What do these results imply?  Obviously, the bargaining skill of the loan officer is very important 
in determining whether a white borrower is charged an overage and the magnitude of those overages.  
However, it is also clear from the interaction effects that the loan officers who are the most skilled at 
bargaining with white clients do not, for whatever reason, exhibit the same effectiveness when 
bargaining with their minority clients.  The signs of these interaction effects are the opposite of MOW, 
and in fact, essentially negate the impact of bargaining for blacks and other minorities.  To see this, we 
note that the sum of the coefficients for MOW and the interaction term measures the net impact of 
bargaining on borrowers of that race.  Wald tests show that the hypothesis that these coefficients sum 
to zero cannot be rejected for blacks (t-statistic = -0.319) or for other minorities (t-statistic = -0.750) 
in the logit equation.  For the Stage 2 regression, the hypothesis is rejected for all groups (t-statistic = 
1.028 for blacks, -0.447 for Hispanics, and –0.619 for other minorities).  Either lenders’ bargaining 
skills do not transfer to these minority groups or they are not being used. 
  Given the results for MOW and the race interaction terms it is important to note that we  
still observe an adverse impact across all minority groups.  The coefficients for the minority  
variables, BLACK, HISPANIC, and OTHER MINORITY are all statistically significant and  
positive in the logit equation, and all are positive in the Stage 2 regression.  This indicates that minorities 
are significantly more likely to pay an overage than similarly situated whites, and when they do, they 
tend to pay higher overages.  Yet, these overages are less than they would be if loan officers utilized 
their full bargaining power.  This result is particularly interesting for several reasons.  First, we have a 21   
market that should be highly competitive.  Second, we have already documented that loan officers’ 
bargaining skills are either not as effective or are not fully utilized in minority negotiations.  Third, the 
institution’s stated policy and past performance suggest that it discourages discrimination.  Finally, we 
find little evidence of higher overages for other groups that might be thought to be at a bargaining 
disadvantage.  For the logistic equation that predicts the likelihood of a borrower having an overage, 
the coefficients for MALE, EDUCATION, AGE, PRIOR OWNERSHIP, SECONDARY, and 
YEARS IN HOME are all statistically insignificant.  In the Stage 2 regression (for those borrowers 
who do pay an overage) only MALE is significant.  Even in this case, the magnitude of the coefficient is 
very small compared to MOW and the race variables. 
One explanation for the result that the bargaining skills of loan officers do not transfer to 
minorities, yet minorities pay more, is that a larger portion of minority borrowers do not shop or 
negotiate at all.  Evidence suggests this is true for automobile purchases.  For example, the Consumer 
Federation of America (1991) reports that 61% of blacks believe that car prices are not negotiable, 
while 31% of whites believed this.  Suppose that racial differences in automobile purchases are similar 
to those in mortgage lending.  Most likely, the extra 30% of blacks who do not bargain or shop are 
distributed randomly across loan officers – certainly, there is no reason to believe that they gravitate to 
loan officers who are good bargainers.  Yet, they are likely to pay higher overages because they fail to 
negotiate.  It is also reasonable to conclude that, at this particular lender, a loan officer who is a good 
bargainer would not seek a still higher overage.  The employer offers fair-lending training, monitors 
overages by race, and limits overages to 2%.  Under such circumstances, a loan officer might well 
conclude that collecting a higher overage is not worth the extra time and risk required to extract it.  This 
result will be explored further in our discussion of refinancings. 22   
    The results are mixed for the hypothesis that risk is an important determinant of overages.  In 
both equations, a likelihood ratio test confirms that the 10 variables that control only for risk are jointly 
significant at the 5% level.  In the logistic analysis, two of these 10 are statistically significant 
individually.  In the Stage 2 regression, of the 10 variables included to control only for risk, none are 
significant.  However, LTV, INCOME, CREDIT PROBLEM, JOB YEARS, SELF-EMPLOYED, 
CHECKING, and SAVINGS all have the expected sign.  Higher total income and longer job tenure 
are associated with lower risk, as are applicants with checking and savings accounts.  Alternatively, 
higher loan-to-value ratios, self-employed borrowers and borrowers with credit problems would tend 
to have higher risk.  The signs of all of these variables, therefore, tend to lower overages under this 
hypothesis.  However, it is difficult to reconcile the significantly positive coefficient on the applicant’s 
number of years in current profession (JOB YEARS) in the logit equation.  One would expect this to 
signal stability and thus lower overages.  In fact, we observe the opposite. 
  We also performed sensitivity tests.  We replaced the set of four binary variables for education 
with two variables signifying HIGH-SCHOOL GRADUATE and COLLEGE GRADUATE.  We also 
included the square of AGE, because at some point additional bargaining skill, experience or stability 
make little difference.  We included a control for jumbo loans.  Such changes had little effect.  In short, 
the data on loans for purchases provide support for the market-power and bargaining hypotheses and 
for the influence of race in the pricing of mortgages, but relatively little support for the importance of 
risk in determining of overages. 
  We next explore the results from refinancings in our dataset. 
Refinancings 
    Likelihood ratio tests (not reported here) show that refinancings are substantially different from 
loans for purchases.  This is not surprising.  First, the original lender has a competitive advantage over 23   
other potential lenders.  Searching for a different lender is time consuming and costly.  A borrower, 
satisfied with the existing lending relationship, is less likely to shop for better deals or to negotiate as 
strenuously.  Also, the original lender can easily produce a list of borrowers likely to benefit by 
refinancing and contact them through routine mailings.  A portion of these borrowers who refinance 
would otherwise not have done so without this initial contact.  We believe that they are less likely to 
comparison shop extensively.  In addition, refinancings are typically approved and closed more quickly 
than are purchases.  This also suggests that there is less incentive to shop and negotiate.  Finally, 
borrowers who refinance are likely to be doing so because refinancing makes them better off.   As 
such, they typically refinance for one of two reasons:  (1) either they wish to borrow money and realize 
that mortgage loan interest is tax deductible or (2) interest rates have fallen and they realize that they 
will be better off by refinancing even given closing costs.  Thus, those who refinance are most likely to 
do so because the net result of the stated terms increases their economic wealth; at least a portion of 
these borrowers may be satisfied with an improved position and be less likely to bargain for a still-
better deal.  Consequently, we would anticipate that overages on refinancings should be higher than 
overages on purchases. 
  The refinancings dataset is slightly different from the dataset for purchases.  There is no 
information on whether the home is a primary or secondary residence, and of course all refinancings 
represent prior ownership.  There is strong evidence that bargaining power and competition help 
explain overage pricing for refinancing mortgages.  VOLUME is significant and negative in the logistic 
equation, but insignificant in determining the magnitude of the overage for those borrowers who pay an 
overage.  Thus, lenders with higher volumes of loans are less likely to collect overages, even though 
there is no apparent impact on the amount of the overage collected.  Similarly, the coefficients on 
FIXED and CONVENTIONAL have a negative and significant impact on the likelihood that an 24   
overage is charged, and FIXED mortgages tend to have lower overages when one is collected.  Thus, 
the evidence that market power and competition help determine whether or not overages are charged is 
quite strong. 
  For the various indirect measures of bargaining skill, results are very similar to the purchase 
estimates in the logit equation.  In the Stage 2 regression for refinancings, MALE has a statistically 
insignificant impact on the magnitude of the overage for those borrowers who pay an overage while two 
education variables are significant.  With the exception of the magnitude of the overage charged for 
Hispanics who pay an overage (column 4), though, the coefficients on the various racial groups are 
insignificant.  In fact, the significance of the coefficient for HISPANIC is driven by a single observation 
having an overage at the financial institution’s designated upper limit of 2%.  If this one loan is omitted, 
the coefficient on HISPANIC also becomes statistically insignificant.  Alternatively, if this observation is 
retained and all minorities are pooled, then there is no significant difference in the minorities as a group 
when compared to loans refinanced by whites.  Similarly, interaction effects corresponding to the 
insignificant race variables are also insignificant.  Thus, race is not a significant factor in the likelihood of 
an overage being charged or in the magnitude of overages that are charged. 
  This leads to a particularly interesting interpretation of our analysis when combined with two other 
facts.  First, while still significant, the impact of MOW is much smaller in the refinancing equation than in 
the purchases equation (a 37.11 versus 54.94 percentage point change in the likelihood that overages 
will be charged and a statistically insignificant 29.66 versus a significant 143.50 basis point change in 
the magnitude of the overages charged, respectively).  This is consistent with our argument that 
households which refinance tend to be more financially sophisticated than households which purchase 
homes.  Our evidence also suggests that more sophisticated borrowers are less likely to pay overages.  
In addition, the proportion of minorities that refinance (12.6% versus 14.6%) is somewhat lower.  A 25   
series of t-tests confirms that the applicant pools for refinancing are more homogeneous with respect to 
race.  Table 7 reports paired t-tests of the means of the independent variables in both samples.  
Comparing whites to blacks on the purchase pool, the number of significant differences is 13 for 
purchases but only eight for refinancings.  Eighteen of the 25 test statistics decline in absolute value.  
For whites and Hispanics, the difference is even more dramatic.  Again, 18 of the 25 test statistics 
decline in absolute value, but here the number of significant differences falls from 12 for purchases to 
only one for refinancings.  Because the pools of borrowers who refinance are more similar, there is no 
evidence of a differential impact across racial groups. 
  The variables that control for risk in Table 6 fair poorly.  We see that of the risk variables, only 
the binary variable for CREDIT PROBLEM is statistically significant and only in the logistic equation.  
Borrowers who refinance with a credit problem on their record have about a 44.23 percentage point 
higher likelihood of being charged an overage.  Paradoxically, though, the insignificance of these risk 
coefficients can be interpreted as providing some support for risk-based explanations of overages.  
That is, virtually every borrower who successfully refinances is a good credit risk.  These owners have 
not only had loans originated but have been paying them for a period of time.  Thus, there is not enough 
variation in credit stature for us to detect pricing differentials.  The only exceptions are borrowers with a 
severe credit problem -- collections, garnishments, bankruptcy, or foreclosure.
13 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
  Lack of data on overages has severely limited research in the pricing of mortgages.  We conduct 
an empirical investigation of the relative importance of competing hypotheses to explain the observed 
differentials in overage pricing.  Our analysis makes several contributions.  First, we are directly able to 
consider the impact of the bargaining capabilities of individual loan officers on the overages paid by 
                                                 
13 This is consistent with Rosenblatt (1997). 26   
minority borrowers.  Second, the dataset is unique and contains a number of variables not available to 
previous researchers.  Third, we use a two-stage selectivity bias model to estimate the parameters of 
the model.  This is the appropriate way to estimate a model in which a relatively large number (in our 
case over 50%) of the observations have dependent variable values that are truncated at zero and 
where heteroskedasticity or non-normality concerns make Tobit analysis inappropriate. 
  We find that a large component of the explained variance in overages is due to a set of variables 
proxying for the degree of market power in markets associated with these loans.  Much of the 
observed overage differentials are due to differences in the bargaining skill and expertise of both loan 
officers and borrowers.  Variables controlling for risk prove less effective in explaining overages, 
perhaps because risk is already incorporated in the rate sheets, or perhaps because our sample 
includes only loans that were approved and made.  Thus, all applicants have relatively good credit 
records, and might not display enough risk variation to detect.  Our direct measure of the relative 
bargaining-power of the individual loan officers, the mean overage for their white borrowers (MOW), 
suggests that their abilities in financial negotiations have an impact on overages that is both statistically 
and economically significant.  However, the coefficients on the interactions between MOW and racial 
subgroups suggest that loan officers do not use their full capabilities when bargaining with minorities.  
Coupled with the reduced importance of bargaining power in the equation for refinancings, this leads us 
to conclude that the significance of the race variables in the purchase equation is obtained because 
more bargaining occurs.  Consequently, differential bargaining skills have an impact on overages. 
  The implications of this paper for policy are particularly important.  The lending institution in 
our study has taken an active and aggressive role in promoting fair lending policies. The lender’s 
policies conform to those imposed by the regulator on other institutions to address discrimination 
in overage pricing. Indeed, this lender would pass regulatory scrutiny regarding CRA efforts and 27   
is nondiscriminatory in its accept/reject decision making. These points are borne out by the 
observed behavior of the institutions’ loan officers regarding the use of their bargaining power 
toward minorities.  Yet, although there is no evidence of discriminatory treatment for those who 
refinance, an adverse impact is observed for minority home purchasers.  There are two 
implications. First, in a case like this, eliminating the racial differentials in overages may likely be 
best accomplished by providing borrowers with more financial information to promote 
competition and bargaining, rather than by enacting additional laws.  Second, lenders and 
regulators may wish to give increased consideration to monitoring loan officer behavior in this 
area. 28   
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Variable Names, Definitions, and Means 
 
Variable Name  Definition  Purchases  Refinancings    
          OVERAGE  overage ($) / loan ($), in basis points.  10.27  13.35   
TERM30  1 = Loan maturity is 30 years; 0 = Otherwise.  0.925  0.633   
FIXED  1 = Loan is fixed-rate; 0 = Otherwise.  0.864  0.966   
CONVENTIONAL  1 = Loan is conventional; 0 = Otherwise.  0.581  0.730   
LOAN AMOUNT  Amount of the loan ($).  95000  91720   
MARKET 
PENETRATION 
Percentage of loans to the racial group of the borrower 
made by the lender in the SMSA of the loan. 
 2.077  2.175   
VOLUME  Number of loans made by a lender in that market.  177.0  174.1   
EDU1  1 = High school graduate; 0 = Otherwise.  0.277  0.252   
EDU2  1 = Training beyond high school; 0 = Otherwise.  0.258  0.267   
EDU3  1 = College graduate but no further education; 
0 = Otherwise. 
0.217  0.216   
EDU4  1= Education beyond college; 0 = Otherwise.   0.162  0.162   
PRIOR OWNERSHIP  1 = At time of application, borrower owned home;  
0 = Otherwise. 
0.337  1.000   
SECONDARY  1 = House is borrower’s secondary residence; 
0 = Primary residence or investment property. 
0.014  0.0000   
YEARS IN HOME  Number of years in current home.  4.228  5.867   
AGE  Borrower age, in years.  37.19  42.55   
LOAN RATE  Contract interest rate on loan (%).  7.427  7.244   
MOW  Mean overage for a loan officer’s white borrowers.  If 
the borrower is white, the mean excludes the 
observation for that borrower. 
8.450  11.44   
BLACK  1 = BLACK; 0 = Otherwise.   0.058  0.060   
HISPANIC  1 = HISPANIC; 0 = Otherwise.  0.063  0.034   
OTHER MINORITY  1 = Other racial group;  
0 = black, Hispanic or white. 
0.024  0.032   
MALE  1 = Borrower is male; 0 = Borrower is female.  0.774  0.825   
LTV  Loan amount $ / property value $.  0.888  0.725   
INCOME  Borrower’s Monthly Income ($).  4622.9  4569.5   
CREDIT PROBLEM  1 = Borrower suffered collections, garnishments, 
bankruptcy, or foreclosure; 0 = Otherwise. 
0.0496  0.031   
JOB YEARS  Years in current profession.  5.339  7.332   
SELF-EMPLOYED  1 = Self-employed; 0 = Otherwise.  0.053  0.099   
OBLIG/INC  Borrower’s monthly obligations / income (%).  31.12  83.37   
CHECKING  1 = Borrower has checking account; 0 = Otherwise.  0.828  0.672   
SAVINGS  1 = Borrower has savings account; 0 = Otherwise.  0.570  0.458   
LIQUID/TA  Borrower’s liquid assets / total assets (%).  26.41      9.177   
         
Number of 
observations: 








Panel A: Difference in Overages by City Branch 
 
       Number of   % Positive  Mean Overage 
      Observations     Overages  in basis points * 
City J             88        40.9    80.1 
City F           274         9.5    74.6 
City E           141        22.7    72.6 
City L             81        27.2    71.4 
City A            144        31.9    67.5 
City C           136        26.5    66.5 
City N           181        14.4    65.5 
City B           244        12.7    62.8 
City H             45        22.2    57.0 
City G           109        11.9    51.0 
City D           115        19.7    49.6 
City M           149        16.8    45.1 
City K             66        24.2    37.5 
City I           229          7.4    27.9 
Total          2002        17.9    51.4 
________________________________________________________________________                                                                                                                                 
The mean in the line marked Total is equally weighted by city. 
 
Panel B: Distribution of Mean Overage by Loan Officer 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Total  Number of Loan Officers: 61 (58 with Positive Overages) 
 
      % of the time a loan officer at     Mean overage collected  
this point of the distribution     by a loan officer at this 
collects a positive overage.           point of the distribution.*                
Maximum:          66.7          2.000 
Top quartile:        27.3          0.750 
Mean:      21.5          0.615 
Median:      19.4          0.600 
Bottom quartile:          8.8          0.406 
Minimum:          0.0          0.125 
 
 
Panel C: Difference in Overages by Race 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                 Other  
        White     Black      Hispanic  Minorities 
 
Number of Observations    1,722      118         109          53 
% Positive Overages       15.9      41.5        25.7         17.0 
Mean Overage Amount*       0.57%      0.76%     0.92%        0.50% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
* Mean includes only those observations with a positive overage. 













Black vs. White 
 
 
Overage Difference,  
Hispanics vs. White 
 
 
Overage Difference,  
















(No. of OBS) 
 City A   0.057   0.081  -0.206  0.206 (115)  0.263 (2)  0.286 (24)  0.000 (3) 
 City B   0.098  -0.072   0.026  0.072 (222)  0.170 (15)  0.000 (4)  0.098 (3) 
 City C   0.334   0.058   0.037  0.151 (144)  0.484 (8)  0.208 (12)  0.188 (2) 
 City D   0.101  -0.091  -0.091  0.091 (94)  0.192 (15)  0.000 (3)  0.000 (3) 
 City E   0.274  -0.097   0.135  0.097 (100)  0.371 (32)  0.000 (2)  0.232 (7) 
 City G   0.186   0.202  -0.033  0.033 (92)  0.219 (8)  0.234 (8)  0.000 (1) 
 City H  -0.023  -0.128   0.185  0.128 (39)  0.105 (1)  0.000 (3)  0.313 (2) 
 City I   0.190  ---  -0.018  0.018 (223)  0.208(3)      ---  0.000 (3) 
 City J   0.458   0.110  -0.115  0.265 (62)  0.723(14)  0.375 (2)  0.150 (10) 
 City K  -0.021   0.429  -0.071  0.071 (326)  0.050(5)  0.500 (4)  0.000 (5) 
 City L  -0.060   0.638  -0.153  0.153 (69)  0.094(4)  0.792 (6)  0.000 (2) 
 City M   0.252   0.795  -0.023  0.048 (136)  0.300(4)  0.844 (4)  0.025 (5) 
 City N   0.099   0.001  -0.094  0.094 (130)  0.193(7)  0.095 (37)  0.000 (7) 
 
Panel B 
Distribution of Overages for the Branches with the Highest and Lowest Differences between Overages Collected from Whites and Minorities. 
Minimum 5 Observations on Each Group. 
 
  City J  City K  City E  City J  City N  City L 
  Black  White  Black  White  Other  White  Other  White  Hispanic  White  Hispanic  White 
Maximum Value  3.125%  2.000%  2.500%  2.000%  1.375%  2.000%  1.500%  2.000%  0.750%  1.750%  2.000%  2.000% 
75% Above  1.250%  0.250%  0.000%  0.000%  0.250%  0.000%  0.000%  0.250%  0.000%  0.000%  2.000%  2.000% 
Median Value  0.187%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.375%  0.000% 
25% Below  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000% 
Minimum Value  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000% 
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TABLE 4 
 














Market Power, Default 
Risk, Approval Risk. 
TERM30  1 if loan maturity is 30 years; 0 
otherwise. 
-, +, - 
Market Power, Default 
Risk, Approval Risk. 
FIXED  1 if loan is fixed-rate; 0 otherwise.  -, -, - 
Market Power, Default 
Risk, Approval Risk. 
CONVENTIONAL  1 if loan is conventional; 0 
otherwise. 
-, -, - 
Market Power, Default 
Risk. 
LOAN AMOUNT  Amount of the loan ($).  -, - 
Market Power.  MARKET 
PENETRATION 
Percentage of loans to the racial 
group of the borrower made by the 
lender in the SMSA of the loan. 
+ 
Market Power.  VOLUME  Number of loans made by a lender 




MALE  1 if borrower is male; 0 if borrower 
is female. 
? 
Individual Bargaining Skill, 
Default Risk, Approval 
Risk. 
EDU1  1 if high school graduate; 0 
otherwise. 
-, -, - 
Individual Bargaining Skill, 
Default Risk, Approval 
Risk. 
EDU2  1 if training beyond high school; 0 
otherwise. 
-, -, - 
Individual Bargaining Skill, 
Default Risk, Approval 
Risk. 
EDU3  1 if college graduate but no further 
education; 0 otherwise. 
-, -, - 
Individual Bargaining Skill, 
Default Risk, Approval 
Risk. 
EDU4  1 if education beyond college; 0 
otherwise.  
-, -, - 
Individual Bargaining Skill, 




1 if at time of application, borrower 
owned home;  0 otherwise. 
-, -, - 
Individual Bargaining Skill, 
Default Risk, Approval 
Risk. 
SECONDARY  1 if house is borrower’s secondary 
residence; 0 if primary residence or 
investment property. 
+, -, - 
Individual Bargaining Skill, 
Default Risk, Approval 
Risk. 
YEARS IN HOME  Number of years in current home.  +, -, - 
Individual Bargaining Skill, 
Default Risk, Approval 
Risk. 
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LOAN RATE  Contract interest rate on loan (%).  + 
Individual Bargaining 
Skill. 
MOW  Mean overage for a loan officer’s 
white borrowers. 
+ 
Race.  BLACK  1 if BLACK; 0 otherwise.   + 
Race.  HISPANIC  1 if HISPANIC; 0 otherwise.  + 
Race.  OTHER 
MINORITY 
1 if other racial group; 0 if black, 
Hispanic or white. 
+ 
Race.  BLACKMOW  MOW if borrower is BLACK; 0 
otherwise. 
? 
Race.  HISPANICMOW  MOW if borrower is HISPANIC; 0 
otherwise. 
? 
Race.  OTHERMOW  MOW if borrower is OTHER; 0 
otherwise. 
? 
Default Risk, Approval 
Risk. 
LTV  Loan amount ($)/ property value 
($). 
+, + 
Default Risk, Approval 
Risk. 
LTV‡80  1 if LTV‡80%, 0 otherwise.  +, + 
Default Risk, Approval 
Risk. 
INCOME  Borrower’s monthly income ($).  -, - 




1 if borrower suffered collections, 
garnishments, bankruptcy, or 
foreclosure; 0 otherwise. 
+, + 
Default Risk, Approval 
Risk. 
JOB YEARS  Years in current profession.  -, - 
Default Risk, Approval 
Risk. 
SELF-EMPLOYED  1 if self-employed; 0 otherwise.  +, + 
Default Risk, Approval 
Risk. 
OBLIG/INC  Borrower’s monthly obligations / 
income (%). 
+, + 
Default Risk, Approval 
Risk. 
CHECKING  1 if borrower has checking account; 
0 otherwise 
-, - 
Default Risk, Approval 
Risk. 
SAVINGS  1 if borrower has savings account; 0 
otherwise. 
-, - 
Approval Risk.  LIQUID/TA  Borrower’s liquid assets / total 
assets (%). 
- 
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TABLE 5 
 
Economic Intuition of the Signs of the Variables Controlling for Default Risk 
A higher loan-to-value ratio (LTV) means less collateral backs the loan, which implies greater risk and 
higher overages.  Thresholds are important, though.  An increase in LTV from 50% to 55% means 
little, but an increase from 80% to 85% means a great deal; in particular, private mortgage insurance 
is necessary if the loan is to be sold in the secondary market.  Hence, we also have LTV‡80 which is 
unity if LTV ‡ 80% and zero otherwise.   Above 80%, increases in loan-to-value mean more than 
they do at lower levels. 
Age.  Maturity, stability and wealth tend to increase with age, reducing the chance of default and 
decreasing overages.  
Higher income tends to mean less chance of missed payments or default, decreasing overages. 
Higher education level means better employment prospects, stability, understanding of contracts and of 
the responsibilities of home ownership (e.g. maintenance), etc.  It is probably correlated with the 
wealth of family members, who might implicitly back the loan.  Thus, higher education levels tend to 
reduce overages. 
Credit problem signals that the borrower has had some difficulty meeting financial obligations in the 
past, tending to increase overages. 
Prior ownership means that the borrower is likely to face fewer surprises in the loan and home-
ownership process, and is more likely to understand what he is undertaking.  This tends to reduce 
overages. 
Higher years in home also means that the borrower is likely to face fewer surprises and is more likely 
to understand what he is undertaking.  This tends to reduce overages. 
Higher years in profession suggests that the person is likely to remain in that profession, leading to 
stable income.  This tends to reduce overages. 
Self-employed individuals generally have less stable incomes, tending to increase overages. 
Higher obligations/income means less money is available to service the mortgage, tending to increase 
overages. 
Borrowers with a checking account or a savings account are more likely to be familiar with the 
financial system and to be stable.  This tends to reduce overages. 
Secondary homebuyers probably have other assets to back the loan, and are more likely to be aware 
of the responsibilities of home ownership.  This tends to reduce overages. 
Higher loan amount means that the borrower has a bigger stake in the property, and therefore works 
harder to preserve it.  Larger loans also tend to be on upscale homes in upscale neighborhoods, 
meaning there is peer pressure to maintain the home.  This tends to reduce overages.  Note that LTV 
is also in the equation, so a bigger loan does not suggest higher LTV.   
30-year mortgages (TERM30) are the longest in our sample.  Longer maturities increase the chance that 
the borrower will encounter problems and default.  This tends to increase overages. 
Fixed rate mortgages have lower default risk.  If interest rates move in favor of the borrower, he strives 
to preserve the favorable terms.  If rates move against him, he can refinance.  This tends to reduce 
overages. 
Conventional mortgages have lower default risk than FHA/VA mortgages.  This tends to reduce 
overages. 36   
  
TABLE 6 
Model Parameter Estimates 
 
  Stage 1 Logit  Stage 2 Regression  Stage 1 Logit  Stage 2 Regression 
  Purchase  Purchase  Refinancing  Refinancing 
  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate 
 Variable  (t-statistic)  (t-statistic)  (t-statistic)  (t-statistic) 
Constant  -5.402  -1.628  -0.680  -1.253 
   -3.499**  -1.627  -0.370  -1.558 
Term30  -0.1992  0.047  -0.014  -0.160 
   -0.494  0.278  -0.053  -1.534 
Fixed  -1.623  -0.317  -1.679  -0.535 
   -4.656**  -1.408  -2.736**  -1.780* 
Conventional  -1.007  n.a.  -0.987  n.a. 
   -4.319**  n.a.  -2.859**  n.a. 
Loan Amount  -1.13 x (10
-6)  1.14 x (10
-6)  -4.92 x (10
-6)  7.45 x (10
-7) 
   -0.364  0.722  -1.310  0.407 
Market penetration  -0.0607  7.63 x (10
-3)  0.093  -9.44 x (10
-3) 
   -1.052  0.280  1.067  -0.280 
Volume  -0.001  -1.90 x (10
-4)  -0.012  1.35 x (10
-3) 
   -0.478  -0.244  -3.779**  0.742 
Male  -0.035  -0.150  -0.078  0.022 
   -0.179  -1.789*  -0.261  0.186 
Edu1  0.079  0.150  -0.339  0.465 
   0.248  1.115  -0.797  2.601** 
Edu2  0.151  0.013  -0.435  0.287 
   0.466  0.097  -1.035  1.668* 
Edu3  0.154  -0.117  -0.265  0.237 
   0.449  -0.806  -0.607  1.376 
Edu4  -0.035  -0.139  -0.589  0.144 
   -0.093  -0.845  -1.226  0.732 
Prior Ownership  -0.309  0.031  n.a.  n.a. 
   -1.322  0.285  n.a.  n.a. 
Secondary Residence  0.114  0.188  n.a.  n.a. 
   0.135  0.526  n.a.  n.a. 
Years in Home  0.022  -0.002  -0.025  0.010 
   1.596  -0.339  -1.095  0.856 
Age  -0.011  0.003  0.004  -0.004 
   -1.221  0.783  0.342  -0.840 
Loan Rate  1.025  0.262  0.531  0.293 
 6.353**  2.330**  2.380**  2.586** 
MOW  4.771  1.435  1.920  0.297 
 4.642**  2.451**  1.872*  0.720 
Black  1.907  0.333  -0.126  -0.216 
 4.689**  1.454  -0.189  -0.800 
Hispanic  2.123  0.543  0.493  1.148 
   4.093**  2.139**  0.537  2.935** 
Other Minority  1.314  0.354  -3.053  0.285 
   2.105**  1.474  -1.303  0.442 37   
 
         
  Stage 1 Logit  Stage 2 Regression  Stage 1 Logit  Stage 2 Regression 
  Purchase  Purchase  Refinancing  Refinancing 
  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate 
  (t-statistic)  (t-statistic)  (t-statistic)  (t-statistic) 
BlackMOW  -5.619  -0.095  -0.351  1.365 
   -1.984**  -0.084  -0.110  1.023 
HispanicMOW  -22.858  -3.814  -3.602  -4.849 
   -3.925**  -1.325  -0.715  -2.182** 
OtherMOW  -8.175  -2.328  9.019  -1.925 
   -1.752*  -1.732*  0.709  -0.713 
LTV  -1.101  0.477  -0.030  -0.217 
 -0.684  0.696  -0.027  -0.514 
LTV‡80  -0.232  -0.275  -0.429  0.075 
   -0.413  -1.107  -0.987  0.504 
Income  -8.0 x (10
-5)  -5.07 x (10
-5)  7.5 x (10
-6)  1.22 x (10
-6) 
 -1.455  -1.582  0.162  0.070 
Credit Problem  -0.312  0.170  1.909  -0.025 
 -0.835  1.067  3.304**  -0.094 
Job Years  0.0316  -0.001  0.003  -0.009 
 2.548  -0.148  0.231  -1.549 
Self-Employed  0.608  0.196  -0.098  0.235 
 1.682*  1.265  -0.242  1.557 
Obligations/Inc  -0.003  -9.40 x (10
-4)  5.0 x (10
-4)  -4.49 x (10
-5) 
   -0.277  -0.185  0.829  -0.204 
Checking  -0.374  -0.011  -0.042  -0.173 
   -1.759*  -0.109  -0.152  -1.650* 
Savings  -0.117  -0.008  0.370  0.085 
   -0.706  -0.116  1.475  0.894 
Liquid/Total Assets  -1.8 x (10
-3)  3.04 x (10
-4)  -8.5 x (10
-3)  4.49 x (10
-3) 
   -0.461  0.193  1.297  1.615 
Mill’s Ratio  n.a.  -0.055  n.a.  0.010 
   n.a.  -0.878  n.a.  0.121 
          
Log Likelihood Function  -508.567  n.a.  -265.464  n.a. 
Adjusted R
2   0.1748 
a  0.1259  0.1614 
a  0.1521 
Number of Observations   1414  222  588  136 
Mean of Dependent Var.  0.1570  65.12 basis points  0.2313   57.73 basis points 
s of  Dependent Var.  0.3646  52.76 basis points  0.4220  49.02 basis points 
** = significant at 5% 
  * = significant at 10% 
       
    a = For the logit equations, the measure presented is McFadden’s pseudo R
2 38   
             Table 7 
 
T-tests of Means by Race, Purchases versus Refinancings. 
 
  Black vs. White  Hispanic vs. White     
Variable Name  Purchase  Refinance  Purchase  Refinance     
Term30   1.79     -1.35   0.71  -0.48     
Fixed  -2.77*   0.15  -0.84  -1.67     
Conventional  -6.74*  -3.27*  -6.45*  -1.07     
Edu1   2.39*  -2.09*   2.93*   0.56     
Edu2   0.70   0.03   3.16*   0.98     
Edu3  -0.41  -0.05   0.67   0.91     
Edu4  -1.27   2.80*  -2.83*  -1.19     
Male  -3.53*  -1.39  -0.24   1.42     
Credit Problem  -0.10  -0.15  -0.24  -0.83     
Self Employed   1.27  -1.53  -1.38  -0.84     
Checking  -2.40*  -2.68*  -3.79*  -0.92     
Savings   0.96   0.34   1.28  -0.96     
Overage   4.46*   1.36   2.45*   1.86     
LTV   10.36*   1.75   7.75*  -0.65     
Loan Amount  -3.28*  -1.91  -4.42*  -1.05     
Market Penetration  -4.91*  -6.71*  -0.88  -0.91     
Volume  -4.65*  -3.44*  -3.23*  -2.31*     
Years in Home   0.39   0.22  -1.31   0.07     
Borrower Age  -0.87  -0.50  -1.79   0.40     
Loan Rate  -0.33   1.61   1.76   0.40     
MOW   3.16*   1.67   2.67*   0.81     
Borrower Income  -4.15*  -2.87*  -4.65*  -1.45     
Job Years   0.77   0.17   0.20   0.52     
Obligations to Inc.   2.27*   1.60   0.92   1.07     
Liquid to Total Assets  -0.58  -5.13*  -1.99*  -0.25     
             
  *=significant at the 5% level.       
     
     
 
 